Venezuelan Migration Into Colombia: Ramifications and Projections

Jun 25

Jun 25 Venezuelan Migration Into Colombia: Ramifications and Projections

Introduction

Venezuelan migration into Colombia is indirectly supporting Colombian drug trafficking organizations through labor in illegal mines and agricultural fields, which contributes to illegal organizations’ resources and profits. Colombian organizations target Venezuelan migrants near the border and within Colombia to work in agricultural coca fields and illegal gold mines to fund organizations and increase their profits, in turn strengthening crime systems within Colombia. The source of Venezuelan migration stems from previous failed attempts to become an industry leader in oil production in turn creating economic collapse, political corruption, and a humanitarian crisis. Colombia instability has led to criminal organizations gaining more power and Venezuelan migrants are disproportionately victimized. Colombian policies designed to address illegal organizations’ power and the status of Venezuelan migrants have failed to significantly impact either situation due to a lack of funding, absence of specific strategies, and restrictions on the legal status of migrants.

Background

The border of Venezuela and Colombia is long and unmanned, making unregulated migration common and illicit activities rampant. Currently, Colombia hosts 2.5 million Venezuelan migrants, with numbers projected to continue to increase as instability in Venezuela continues. [1] Venezuelan migrants are entering through both legal and illegal channels. As seen in Figure One, the red line denotes the typical migration pattern from Venezuela into Colombia, and the red squares represent illegal entry points.

Figure One: Map of Migratory Routes from Venezuela into Colombia (Source: Doctors Without Borders)

Full Resolution Map Found at: https://reliefweb.int/map/colombia/colombia-migration-venezuela-migratory-routes-crossing-points-and-refugee-urban

Venezuelan migration into Colombia has, and will continue to, cause widespread effects throughout the region and the United States. Migration patterns and mass migration have the potential to create vast consequences for states, like economic, environmental, and political crises. In recent years, mass migration from Venezuela into Colombia and beyond have created enormous ramifications that affect nearby countries as well as the United States. Irregular migration limits regional governments’ abilities to provide basic services to a growing population and often creates political instability due to the controversial debates surrounding immigration.[2] Colombia is also the world’s largest cocaine producer and produces 51% of the world’s cocaine supply,[3] which is then smuggled into the United States and is sold to Americans. Finally, the United States is economically invested in both Venezuela and Colombia, as it is holding a high level of foreign direct investment (FDI) which had a combined total of $10.3 billion USD in 2022, amounts which both increased by nearly 5 percent from 2021.[4] The combination of drug trafficking, regional instability, and financial investments deem this issue salient in terms of American national security and protecting American economic interests abroad.

Venezuelan Migrants Indirectly Supporting Transnational Crime Organizations Through Labor

We assess that illegal gold mining operations and agricultural drug operations in Colombia provide opportunities for drug organizations to take advantage of Venezuelan migrants for their own gain and lead to Venezuelans indirectly supporting transnational crime organizations. Colombian organizations directly target migrants due to limited monetary opportunities elsewhere; the migrants give the illegal organizations an immense labor force to generate funds.

Background

Revenue streams are one of the most salient aspects of the logistics of illegal organizations. Venezuelan migration contributes to revenue of Colombian crime organizations in two ways: through illegal gold mines and by working in agricultural fields growing illegal substances.

Illegal mines in Colombia gained strength as the global demand of gold and increased price of gold increased opportunities for profits, which led to more armed organizations involved in the exploitation and mining of gold. Specifically in Colombia, the finances from the gold have encouraged and lengthened armed conflicts and heightened instability. Illegal gold trade represents over 70% of national production in Colombia and makes up to almost 3% of Colombia’s total exports and 85% of its precious metal exports.[5] Furthermore, Colombia is naturally a country with vast gold deposits; most of the deposits are in Antioquia, Chocó, and Bolivar located in North, East, and South Colombia, but about a third of Colombia’s states—called departments—report gold production.[6] It is important to mention, however, that other resources are being exploited within Colombia like tin, coltan, and gems, but none have had the incredibly profitable financial effect of the illegal gold mining.[7]

Illegal coca farming in Colombia produces the world’s largest amount of coca, the raw ingredient in cocaine, and about 204,000 hectares across Colombia are dedicated to its production in 2021.[8] An estimated output rose 24% to 1.73 million kilograms in 2023.[9] About 45,000 Venezuelans migrate into Colombia daily, and the labor force needed for the vast farms is notably large.[10] To gain labor for reduced prices, drug organizations exploit weakened communities within Colombia to work in their fields by preying on Venezuelans with limited job opportunities.

Venezuelan Migrants’ Participation In Illicit Gold Mining

Illegal gold mines within Colombia indirectly contribute to heightened violence and resources for drug and armed organizations. We assess that the money gained from the mines provides funds for drug trafficking organizations to utilize towards resources and allows greater exploitation of Venezuelan migrants by providing illegal armed groups in Colombia with more than 3 billion USD worth of funding annually.[11][12] The funding provides illegal groups with additional weapons and the ability to obtain more resources to incite conflict with the government and other armed organizations, contributing to a rise in violent occurrences.[13] The Venezuelan workers inside of these mines indirectly contribute to illegal organizations within Colombia.

Colombian illegal mining operations have been providing a significant amount of funds for Colombian drug trafficking organizations. Recent evidence suggests illegal gold mining has become the main source of income for illegal armed groups in Colombia, even surpassing cocaine trafficking, and illegal mining accounts for more than 80% of Colombian gold production.[14] The revenue gained from the illicit gold mining and trade is used to fund drug trafficking, extortion, human trafficking, and smuggling for groups like the ELN and FARC.[15] Furthermore, illegal gold exports have been tied through trade-based money laundering, which benefits Colombian illegal armed and drug organizations and provided over 5.6 billion worth of revenue over an 8 year period.[16] A point of concern is also the increase in exportation to free trade zones, as there is less oversight in these regions.[17] The ELN and other organized crime groups utilize the illegal gold trade due to the opportunity of higher profits and fewer risks.[18] The risks are minimal due to the organization receiving the revenue directly within the region they control and limited traceability.[19] Antioquia, Chocó, and Bolivar—the three regions with the most gold—are all in control by the “Clan del Golfo” cartel, one of the biggest in Colombia and a significant amount of their revenue is due to gold mining.[20] Gold mining is an incredibly valuable resource for crime organizations to gain revenue with little risk.

Venezuelan migrants have been exploited in several of the steps of the gold supply chain within Colombia. We assess that illegal mining organizations utilize subsistence miners and migrants to mine for gold in vulnerable regions to support their transnational crime organizations.[21]

Additionally, due to the ongoing crises in Venezuela affecting the economy and government, Venezuela has become a popular area for crime organizations like the ELN and has encouraged gold production.[22] Gold is smuggled into Colombia from Venezuela, at times utilizing migrants to move the gold for it to be sold.[23] The ELN has been known to move gold from Venezuela’s Orinoco Mining Arc to Colombia in this method. Furthermore, CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies—a United States based think tank—) and Reuters report that the Maduro Regime is partnered with the ELN and FARC, and that Maduro is utilizing illegal mining to strengthen the regime’s security and survivability.[24][25][26] Most gold mined in Venezuela is moved to Colombia.[27] Once the gold is in Colombia, it is exported.[28]

Since the government is not widely present in a lot of the remote areas where gold is found, it is easier for crime organizations to illegally mine gold.[29] Moreover, it is the organization’s responsibility to staff a mine, and they “frequently draw workers from other regions,” including near the border between Venezuela and Colombia, given that there are about 74 mines near the border and the border between Venezuela and Colombia is about 2,200 kilometers long.[30] To conclude, local and migrant populations are one of the main sources of labor for the illegal gold mines within Colombia. When Venezuelan migrants provide that labor, the transnational crime organizations benefit and gain significant profit.

Venezuelans both in Colombia and Venezuela are often exploited to work in the mines and through other illicit work forces.[31] For example, nearly 43% of areas with illegal mining activity also report illicit coca production, and eight of the ten Colombian municipalities with the highest levels of alluvial mining activity also illicitly grow coca. Workers are frequently subjected to “threats of violence” and are there due to “economic necessity.”[32]

Venezuelan Migrants’ Contribution to the Drug Trade Through Agricultural Labor

Venezuelan migrants also provide manual labor in drug fields for Colombian illegal organizations due to limited opportunities elsewhere, indirectly supporting the Colombian drug trade financially. We assess that this labor supports transnational crime networks by providing more resources and funds.

Almost 2.5 million Venezuelan migrants are currently living in Colombia after fleeing due to political and economic stability; most struggle with finding jobs due to having limited resources. In order to find work, many Venezuelan migrants find work in illicit businesses connected to armed and criminal organizations, which are mostly located next to the border. The Venezuelan migrant population in Colombia is extremely vulnerable, with about 16% of all homeless individuals in Colombia being Venezuelan.[33] Venezuelan migrants are targeted due to the benefit for the Colombian illegal organizations of paying the migrants less in more dangerous situations, like the migrant workforce in the illegal agricultural and mining industries.[34] By paying the migrants less, Colombian transnational organizations are able to fund more illegal activities and gain a higher profit margin.

Finding work in the formal Colombian economy is extremely difficult, and 48% of workers were employed in the informal sector at the end of 2021, and about 90% of Venezuelan migrants are workers in the informal economy, where the pay is less and unstable.[35] Most Venezuelan migrants work in bigger cities, but border cities like Norte De Santander and Aracua are also popular regions, where many mines are located.[36] Furthermore, if migrants cannot find work in bigger cities, many Venezuelan migrants choose to work in remote regions in Colombia working in gold mining, fuel smuggling, and coca growing.[37] The remote regions are beneficial for illegal organizations due to less oversight from governmental agencies.

Additionally, Venezuelan migrants are vulnerable to being recruited in crime organizations due to not knowing Colombian laws and their rights while also being unprotected migrants due to their lack of documentation. Colombian illegal organizations frequently exploit migrants in order to obtain cheap labor, heightening the profits of their organization.

Conclusion

To conclude, due to poor living conditions in Venezuela, migrants move to Colombia and end up extremely vulnerable, with opportunities for work scarce. Colombian illegal organizations take advantage of these migrants and utilize their labor in mines and coca fields to increase their finances and grow their organization.

Instability in Venezuela

We assess Venezuela’s failed attempt at becoming a prosperous petrostate catalyzed its migration exodus. [38] Since the 1920s when oil was discovered in the country, multiple government leaders have passed through with goals to dominate the Latin American oil industry, yet failed to maintain proper facilities and infrastructure. Due to this focus on profit and influence, economic collapse, political corruption, and a substantial humanitarian crisis has emerged and is pushing citizens to find better living conditions outside of Venezuela.

Economic Collapse

We assess Venezuela’s current economic collapse resulted from attempting to become a prosperous petrostate. Economists believe petrostates are thought to be vulnerable to an economic phenomenon called Dutch disease. In an afflicted country, resource growth attracts large inflows of foreign investments leading to appreciation of local currency and boosts for now comparatively cheaper imports. This appreciation steals labor and capital away from other important economic sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, which are contenders for competitiveness and growth amongst other countries. As the labor-intensive export industries fall behind, unemployment can rise, and a country can develop a high dependence on exporting natural resources. In more extreme cases, a petrostate will sacrifice local oil production and derive most oil wealth through hefty taxes on foreign drilling operations. These economies are then left vulnerable to unpredictable swings in capital flight and global energy prices.[39]

Venezuela is the archetype of a failed petrostate according to economists of The Economics Society.[40] More than a century after being discovered in the country, oil still continues to play the dominant role in Venezuela’s fortune. In 1922, geologists struck oil and in a matter of years, more than 100 foreign companies were producing oil. Annual production exploded during the 1920s, from just over a million barrels to 137 million, putting Venezuela second only to the U.S. for total output in 1929. By 1935, Dutch disease began to settle in and oil was prioritized over other sectors, accounting for over 90 percent of total exports. Soon, the Hydrocarbons Law of 1943 was passed and within five years, the government’s income had increased sixfold.[41] In 1960, Venezuela established its first state oil company, the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation, and increased oil companies’ income tax to 65 percent of profits. Venezuela accrued the highest per-capita income of all Latin American countries following a five-month embargo in 1973 which quadrupled oil prices. Over the next two years, the growth added $10 billion to state repositories, allowing for large mismanagement. It is estimated that almost $100 billion was embezzled between 1972 and 1997 according to the Council on Foreign Relations.[42] While oil prices plummeted in the 1980s, Venezuela faced economic decline and soaring inflation; simultaneously, it accrued massive foreign debt in purchasing foreign refineries in the United States. In 1989, President Carlos Andrés Pérez launched financial bailout measures through the International Monetary Fund provoking deadly riots, and, in 1992, Hugo Chávez launched a failed coup and rose to national fame.[43]

While being rich in oil reserves, Venezuelan government leaders fell victim to oil tunnel vision resulting in an unbalanced economy. This hyperfixation since their discovery has led the country to suffer economic collapse with output shrinking by three-quarters and rampant hyperinflation contributing to a scarcity of basic goods for Venezuelan citizens. This lack of necessary resources at affordable prices due to poor economic conditions provides reason for Venezuelans to migrate elsewhere.

Government Corruption

We assess Venezuela’s government corruption resulted from attempting to become a petrostate. As its government began to shift their sights towards reigning Latin American oil with the passing of the Hydrocarbons Law of 1943, the political atmosphere surrounding the proceeds of oil began to change. The desire for leading the oil markets slowly shifted towards greed and opportunity for personal gain from political leaders. In 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected president on a socialist platform, pledging to use Venezuela’s vast oil wealth to reduce poverty and inequality. While his costly missions cut poverty by 20 percent and expanded social services, he took many steps precipitating a long steady decline in the country’s oil production which had recovered to 3.5 million barrels per day (BPD), nearly matching its former high of 3.8 million BPD in 1970.[44] During the Venezuelan general strike of 2002-2003, Chávez fired thousands of PDVSA[45] workers, gutting the company of important technical expertise. In 14 years, he spent $1 trillion of oil profits in massive social programs while not investing back into oil production facilities.[46] Over the course of his presidency which ended in 2013, petroleum reserves dwindled and government debt more than doubled.[47] Together with income tax revenue, Venezuelan income during Chávez’s presidency amounted to approximately $700 billion, which is nowhere to be seen in terms of public works or effective health and education programs according to the CATO Institute.[48] In effect, Venezuela remained oil-rich, but President Chávez left it cash poor.

During his presidency, Chávez also controlled his popularity amongst the working class to expand the powers of his presidency and edged the country towards authoritarianism. He ended term limits, took control of the Supreme Court, closed independent press outlets, and nationalized hundreds of foreign-owned assets and private businesses like oil projects run by ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil. These reforms created the path for current president Nicolás Maduro to establish a dictatorship as global oil prices plummeted, and Venezuela’s economy went into free fall because it holds no other economically resilient industries.

As the country’s economy grew weaker from neglect of reinvestment in oil refining and production, former President Chávez and current President Maduro utilized the opportunity to create an authoritarian regime resulting in personal gain. This political corruption still remains today, in turn creating a humanitarian crisis within Venezuela.

Humanitarian Crisis

We assess that the current Venezuelan humanitarian crisis resulted from continual economic instability and political corruption. This event has become the second largest international displacement crisis in the world with 7.3 million Venezuelans displaced globally.[49] Citizens are fleeing the country at an average rate of 2,000 people per day and around 20 percent of the population has left according to USA for UNHCR.[50] Food insecurity remains a challenge due to excessive dollar-denominated prices of food with high inflation rates. Massive power blackouts are common, leaving food to spoil, hospitals and businesses struggling to operate, and the transport system in chaos. These episodes result from an underfunded and overexploited electrical network. Venezuela’s healthcare system is also under collapse turning the nation into an incubator for diseases like malaria, yellow fever, diphtheria, dengue, and tuberculosis, some of which were considered previously eradicated. Under President Maduro, opposition to his reign can lead to detention and abuse. As of August 2023, the government had imprisoned 282 political prisoners including military officers, politicians, and civic leaders. [51] Maduro has also rewarded allies by allowing them to profit off drug trafficking and illegal mining, leading to growing political connections within the criminal environment. Due to economic instability, corruption, and President Maduro’s disinterest in international humanitarian relief, Venezuelan nationals have found themselves fleeing for a better life.

Conclusion

We assess Venezuelan citizens are leaving the country and migrating to neighboring countries because of the negative effects resulting from an attempt to become a petrostate. In attempting to become the Latin American industry leader for oil production, Venezuelan leaders neglected to maintain priority of other economic sectors and retain industry experts in influential positions. These acts could have been overturned, but recently elected officials like Chávez and Maduro passed legislation creating more restriction of autonomy in oil production, further catapulting the economy towards a downturn. With less autonomy overall in Venezuela, opposition to the current government is quickly shut down and discourages its citizens with the lack of democracy in the country. The decrease in autonomy, economic collapse, political corruption, increased crime, and humanitarian crisis all are a result of past and present government officials craving high rankings and influence within oil production while neglecting their citizens, promoting one of history’s largest migration crises.

Instability in Colombia

We assess that instability in Colombia, political and economic, has fostered an environment where migrants from Venezuela face danger. This danger stems from the migrants being largely ignored by the Colombian government, victimization by criminal organizations, and negative public perceptions by Colombians placing Venezuelans at fault for the nation’s problems.

Explanation of Political Instability

We assess that Colombia has high levels of instability due to the government’s failure to deliver key reforms and their proposal of unrealistic legislation. The discontent of Colombian citizens with the country’s political state led to massive waves of protests.[52] In 2019, former president Ivan Duque’s government announced its intentions to introduce legislation that would reduce benefits for workers and retirees.[53] Duque denied his government was drafting these bills, and other government officials claimed that protestors were associated with radical leftist organizations. The government attempted to censor the organizers of the protests, and their actions backfired.[54] Protestors continued their demonstrations. They continued through 2021. Police clashed with the protestors, which led to escalation and numerous deaths.[55] Eventually, the violence lessened and the government withdrew their controversial agendas.[56] The government's weaknesses in leadership were exposed, and they opened a dialogue with protestors.[57]

On 7 August 2022, Gustavo Petro assumed office as the President of Colombia. He is the country’s first ever left-wing president.[58] He is a defender of increased progressive taxation plans. Only 5% of Colombians pay income tax and Petro plans to increase taxes on the rich. But some of his proposals are highly unlikely to be successful, such as giving every unemployed person a job in the public sector.[59] These key reforms have stalled in congress, and Petro’s approval rating has dropped to 30%.[60]

The Threats Migrants Face and Their Consequences

We assess that Colombia’s unstable state has been stoked by dangerous factors that have continued the cycle of growing political instability and discontent. These factors include crippling socioeconomic inequality, a lack of public services, problems in law and order, organized crime, and high youth unemployment.[61]

Socioeconomic inequality in Colombia has crippled the country for decades and continues to be a main driving factor for instability. The top 10% of earners in the country received nearly 40% of total income, which is 10 times more than the amount the bottom 20% earned.[62] Colombian communities, especially in rural areas, lack basic infrastructure and public services. Often, there are no staff to provide services such as water, sanitation, health care, and education.[63] There are classrooms in these areas with no roofs, doors, or materials. There are little to no permanent staff and teachers often do not remain for substantial periods of time. It is difficult for children to attend school and this leads to them being prime targets for militant groups and other actors. In addition, the drinking water is low quality, leading to disease, and is detrimental to their health. There are aqueducts, but they are typically hand-made. Individuals in Colombia—especially migrants, who are in lower-class neighborhoods—usually are left to their own devices to obtain unhygienic water from rivers, lakes, and collect rainwater from unsanitary sources.[64] Migrants are supposed to have access to public services, such as education and health systems, under the Temporary Protection Status legislation. However, the legislation only covers migrants who enter Colombia before May 28, 2023.[65] This means that any migrants after this date do not legally have access to education, health services, or infrastructure, worsening the situation for the migrant population.

Problems with law and order have continued to worsen in recent years. Former President Alvaro Uribe’s administration attacked and intimidated Supreme Court justices and journalists. They also illegally wiretapped journalists, judges, and human rights defenders.[66] His broad support fueled his power to do so, and his supporters did not care for law, especially if it got in his way. Armed guerilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have caused problems and killed many innocent civilians since their initial uprising in the 1960s. The ELN is of particular concern, and it continues to be a threat to Colombia’s rule-of-law.[67]

Several paramilitary and guerilla groups in Colombia are involved in long-standing conflicts fueled by drug trafficking. These groups are involved in transnational organized crime and have massive social impact on communities in which they are present. They exert control and governance over these areas, regulating civilian activities, creating and implementing norms, and even provide social services when the state does not, keeping up their guise and gaining approval from civilians.[68] This contributes to Colombia’s political instability because the paramilitary and guerilla groups are able to provide services that the government cannot, which further lowers Colombian’s confidence in their government.

High youth unemployment plagues the country, with a rate of nearly 20%.[69] This number increases when referring to Venezuelan migrants as research shows that they face higher unemployment than Colombians and on average earn 30% less than domestic workers.[70] Furthermore, 31% of migrants stated that they risked eviction, and 25% face food insecurity and drink non potable water.[71] As both the Colombian youth and the migrant population continues to suffer, there have been increases in negative government perceptions among youth due to the government’s failure to deliver promised social reform on these issues. These youth’s feelings of hopelessness make them susceptible to radicalization and they tend to be more revolutionary in their politics. Due to this, they are targeted frequently by groups such as the ELN and other paramilitary organizations looking for recruits.[72]

Connection to Venezuelan Migrants

We assess that conditions in Colombia have led to Venezuelan migrants experiencing displacement unregulation of their legal immigrant status, a lack of resources to provide for their families, and are often cheap recruits for armed and criminal groups in Colombia’s cities and countryside. Migrants from Venezuela continue to pour into Colombia through the countries’ loose borders in search of a better situation, but once they make it to Colombia, migrants continue to live and work in harsh conditions. Informal settlements where migrants pay by day to reside that are springing up around border towns are where many have relocated to after crossing the Colombian border.[72] Inhabitants of these settlements have described their conditions as inhumane. Inside their dilapidated homes, families will huddle together in small single rooms and share mattresses.[73] Migrants have to work on the street selling cigarettes, trash bags, candy, and other similar products to afford staying in these settlements and make ends meet.[74] Although Bogota has offered residency rights to nearly 2 million migrants, the migrants face extreme hardship and have little to no resources to sustain themselves.[75] The government’s promises, while compassionate, are not typically carried out to their full extent because of a lack of economic support and their legal status remains largely unregulated.

Because of this extreme poverty, unemployment, lack of public support systems, and the poor living conditions, migrants in Colombia often turn to other forms of income. These incomes, often illegal, are the ways most migrants are able to survive. Paramilitary groups mentioned earlier often prey upon migrants and use them as cheap and easy recruits. For most, there is practically no choice but to rely on informal employment due to the lack of resources and financial options and these armed gangs are very successful in recruiting migrants. The groups make the migrants carry out high-visibility crimes and expose themselves to extreme physical danger, often promising food and shelter in return. Migrants are also vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation.[76]

If migrants do find more traditional work, it is usually agrarian or menial in nature. In agrarian avenues, migrants cultivate coca, which is largely controlled by armed groups, paramilitary forces, and drug cartels. [78]

Migrants are normally paid less than Colombians, and they find themselves at odds with the Colombian workforce. In a situation where Colombian workers earn 70,000 pesos ($17.50 USD) per day, Venezuelans are typically paid 30,000 pesos ($7.50 USD).[79] Even if a migrant is frustrated at their pay, they can be fired in favor of a worker willing to do their job for little pay. The economic competition and desperation between migrants and native Colombians has led to great internal conflicts.[80]

This frustration that Colombian workers experience has been a factor for migrants facing growing rates of xenophobia. According to a Gallup poll, 69% of Colombians had an unfavorable view of Venezuelan migrants.[81] These xenophobic tensions often rise during periods of high crime and unrest due to some native Colombians attributing it to the migrants because they are easy targets. Furthermore, migrants in Colombia are treated poorly when they receive jobs and are often victims of xenophobic crimes.[82] Migrants who have been exploited for work are painted as villains.[83] The xenophobia makes it incredibly difficult for migrants to obtain positions in Colombian places of work or establish themselves in Colombian society and, even when they are able to obtain jobs, continued discrimination and bad working conditions create horrible conditions which forces them to seek employment and support elsewhere, often through illegal means.

Research has shown that Venezuelans are more likely to be victims of violent crimes rather than perpetrators. The negative public perception of Venezuelans by Colombians is the main driving factor of why Venezuelans are unable to live a stable life in Colombia. Politicians, public figures, and members of the public have viewed them as the causes of chaos, high crime, low wages, instability and insecurity, and disorder.

Conclusion

The instability in Colombia, political and economic, has created an environment where migrants from Venezuela face danger on all levels. This danger stems from the migrants being failed by the Colombian government, victimization by criminal organizations, desperation to survive in nearly unlivable conditions, and negative public perceptions by Colombians placing Venezuelans at fault for the nation’s problems that lead to increased xenophobia.

Colombian Policies

We assess that Colombia’s political policies addressing migration and drug trafficking organizations are unlikely to significantly affect the impact of migration on these organizations due to a lack of funding, insufficient strategies regarding sources of funding for these organizations, and restrictions on legal status for migrants. The Colombian Counternarcotics policy, rolled out in September 2023, suffers from a lack of funding needed to implement proposed coca eradication efforts and absence of concrete measures to address illegal mining’s role of supporting Colombian drug trafficking organizations. In addition, efforts to provide Venezuelan migrants with legal protection and status lack any far reaching impacts due to restrictions on which migrants can obtain this protection and severe underfunding.

Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelan Migrants

We assess that it is unlikely that Temporary Protection Status will help Venezuelan migrants obtain formal employment due to legal restrictions and the financial burden it places on the Colombian government. In 2021, the Colombian government implemented the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for Venezuelan Migrants policy. The objective of this policy is to allow undocumented migrants to obtain temporary resident status for a period of ten years in Colombia, a period in which they would have the opportunity to obtain a resident visa that allows them to remain in Colombia longer than the original 10 year period. This provides migrants under this protection with access to formal employment, education, healthcare, and financial services.[84] In theory, this would provide Venezuelan migrants with a way to legally support themselves in Colombia after they migrated. The economic situation for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia is much worse than the majority of the Colombian population, with 63.4% living in monetary poverty and 24.1% living in extreme poverty.[85] This policy looks to provide ways to improve quality of life for those living in these conditions.

The issue with the TPS policy is that it does not address a significant part of the Venezuelan migrant population in Colombia. In order to gain TPS, migrants must meet the requirements set out by the Petro government. Undocumented migrants who can demonstrate that they were in Colombia as of January 31, 2021 and migrants who legally entered the country before May 28, 2023 can apply for TPS. Additionally, those who are beneficiaries of an entry permit, special permission of residence, or already applying for a visa before the foreign ministry are eligible to obtain this status.[86] This means that illegal and undocumented immigrants are now unable to obtain this protection, and therefore deprived of the access to employment, education and health services.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1,611,317 special protection permits have been delivered. However, there are an estimated 2,477,588 documented Venezuelan migrants in Colombia.[87] This leaves a significant portion of the migrant population who have not applied or are not eligible to receive this protection. As migration is projected to increase, and any migrants who have entered past May 28, 2023 are ineligible for TPS, this policy will not be effective in offering support to current and future Venezuelan migrants.

In addition to these tight restrictions, the TPS plan requires significant financial support for which Colombia relies on outside sources. The UNHCR estimates that the TPS Action Plan requires roughly $16 million USD to fully implement for all eligible Venezuelan migrants. This plan includes registration, orientation/outreach, and reception in addition to the provision of basic needs for those registered. These efforts are severely underfunded, meaning that not only are some eligible migrants missing the program, but those registered are being deprived of some of the benefits of the program as well. Without the funding, the TPS program is unable to expand to rural communities or handle increased migration patterns. It also leaves migrants vulnerable to exploitation, discrimination, and deprivation of basic needs as a lack of funding fails to provide those for migrants who have registered.[88]

Without access to formal employment or a legal way to gain resident status, informal work which does not require a visa or state identification will be the only option. Migrants living in extreme poverty have to accept any work or income available to them, which often comes from drug trafficking organizations looking to take advantage of desperate migrants through cheap labor. The activities that drug trafficking organizations are involved in are often illicit economies which require secrecy, such as illegal mining or coca farming. This secrecy and the efforts of the drug trafficking organizations to remain outside of the government’s power mean that migrants do not need any form of identification to work in these operations, nor do they need to worry about access to financial services to receive payment for their work. Because TPS in Colombia has significant restrictions for Venezuelan migrants and is very underfunded, it is unlikely that this initiative will deprive drug organizations of their undocumented labor force, and therefore the policy will not have much impact on migration past 2023.

Colombian Counternarcotics Policy

We assess that Petro’s counternarcotics policy is unlikely to prevent drug trafficking organizations from utilizing migrant labor due to underfunded coca mitigation strategies and an absence of illegal mining strategies. The new counter narcotics policy for Petro’s government promises to “give oxygen” to the territories, communities, people and ecosystems that have been disproportionately affected by the illegal drug market and “asphyxiate” the areas where criminal groups generate violence and profit off illicit economies. In strategies related to the labor that migrants are participating in which support drug trafficking organizations, the policy specifically details plans to address coca plantations. The policy proposed is a mix between forced eradication of coca crops and voluntary eradication. Forced eradication will be prioritized when coca production exceeds an amount set by the Council on Narcotics, if cultivators continue planting after the release of the policy, if they have the infrastructure to create cocaine on their plantation, or if cultivators continuously expand their crop yield.[89] Under the Duque government, this strategy was pursued in all cases of coca plantations and was not as effective as the government originally hoped.

However, Petro has shifted the focus to rely more on what the policy terms “voluntary eradication” since he took office. The counternarcotics policy relies on the idea that the Colombian government will offer subsidies and economic alternatives to farmers who voluntarily pull up their crops, which was part of the 2016 FARC peace deal. However, the original promises of subsidies were never delivered, and Petro has decided on an even more ambitious policy which includes statements about introducing investments in agrarian reform, rural infrastructure, and rural development. The Petro government has also agreed to allow coca farmers to keep their crops until the alternatives become economically sustainable.[90] These ideas were discussed and debated earlier this year in March before being implemented officially through the new counternarcotics policy, however there is low confidence in the implementation due to the failures in policy in the past and the increased burden of the new policies.

The issue with this shift in policy is that it may be more costly than what Colombia can support. According to statements by Justice Minister Néstor Osuna, the investment required for crop substitution alone would be 21 billion pesos (approximately $5 billion).[91] While this is already a significant financial burden on the government, it is also estimated that implementing voluntary eradication in addition to other initiatives presented in the policy will require a much greater investment than originally projected. This ambitious initiative may overwhelm the state’s capacity, especially as President Petro pursues reform policies in other areas.[92]

An additional concern over implementation of the policy is whether or not the policy will be able to continue once Petro no longer holds the presidency, as Colombian presidents have been limited to one term since 2015. He is seeking far-reaching reforms which will take over a decade to implement fully, and the policy is unlikely to see much progress in the remaining three years of his term due to opposition in Congress of his other reforms taking priority in conversations.[93] With Petro unable to run for reelection, due to Colombia’s one term limit, the best hope for continuation would be for Petro’s leftist coalition to take power in the 2026 presidential elections, or consolidate a hold on power through Congress in general elections. However, opposition candidates swept regional elections on October 29, 2023 in what was largely seen as an influential election for those planning to run for President in 2026.[94] The economic burden and low likelihood of continuation of policy decrease the possible effectiveness of these policies.

It is worth noting that the policy does not specifically mention strategies to combat illegal mining operations, which often employ Venezuelan migrants. There is evidence that illegal gold mining is often used as a way to launder proceeds of drug trafficking and that illegal armed groups and drug traffickers are often the main sources of funding for these operations.[95] Despite this, the counternarcotics policy does not reference the mines in its section on the “Persecution of Illegal Finances and the Fights Against Money Laundering.” The section vaguely references targeting operations commonly used to generate illicit income for drug trafficking through counterintelligence operations and criminal investigations, which possibly includes illegal mining due to its link to the armed groups which are largely associated with drug trafficking.[96] Outside of this policy, the Colombian government has declared a “War on Illegal Mining” which focuses on destroying machinery used to mine gold and shutting down illegal mines through criminal investigations. However, it is unclear how effective these tactics will be as gold products are harder to track than cocaine. These limitations restrain the usefulness of these operations until authorities can confidently identify operations where armed drug trafficking groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), are running illegal mining facilities.[97] The lack of concrete policies towards illegal mining and the difficulty of even identifying these operations means that policies are unlikely to affect the mining sites, leaving migrants to continue to form a labor force for the drug trafficking organizations which profit off of these sites.

Conclusion

A lack of economic support, need for detailed and concrete policies, and limitations of migration policies all contribute to the reduced effectiveness of Colombia’s policies. Without strong policies which attempt to cut off funding and labor to drug trafficking organizations or improve the living conditions of Venezuelans, it is unlikely that there will be a reduction in migrant labor for Colombian drug trafficking organizations. This means that Venezuelan migrants will continue to indirectly support these organizations as they work for their illicit operations.

Conclusion

To conclude, Venezuelan migration into Colombia supports transnational crime organizations in the region by providing indirect aid through labor in fields and mines. This migration into Colombia is a result of economic collapse, political corruption, and poor living conditions in Venezuela due to government prioritization of oil exports rather than its citizens. The political and economic instability in Colombia has led to an environment where migrants from Venezuela face danger on all levels. Although Colombia has designed policies to mitigate the power of drug trafficking organizations and address Venezuelan migration and the situations mentioned above, a lack of funding and legal restrictions make it difficult for the policies to achieve their goals.

We find it likely that this migration will not cease in the near future—next 1-2 years—due to ongoing economic and political instability in both Colombia and Venezuela, meaning that drug trafficking organizations will continue to have access to a cheap and plentiful migrant labor force. Not only will this worsen instability and transnational crime organizations’ influence in Colombia and Venezuela, but it also impacts the United States. Efforts to support regional stability through American financial investments and methods used to impede transit of Colombian cocaine to the United States, which are made in an attempt to promote national security, will continue to be impacted by the effects of irregular migration and its contribution to the power held by drug trafficking organizations in the region.

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