(U) Chinese Economic Interests Likely to Drive Chinese Support of the DRC

(U) Chinese Economic Interests Likely to Drive Chinese Support of the DRC

Analysis by Alex Ball, Will Bittner, Kyle Butcher, and Lake Dodson

Published March 22nd, 2024

(U) Due to China’s greater economic and security interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), we assess it is highly likely that China will support the DRC economically and logistically should its conflict with Rwanda escalate. 

(U) In December 2023, fighting reignited between Rwandan-backed rebels (M23) and the DRC in North Kivu Province. Both the DRC and Rwanda are members of China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), a global project of Chinese infrastructure investment [1]. However, the volume of trade between China and the DRC is forty times larger than between China and Rwanda [2], and the DRC’s exports to China are dominated by critical minerals, such as cobalt and copper, while Rwanda primarily exports agricultural products [3].

(U) Heightened conflict in North Kivu Province raises security concerns in China due to the large number of Chinese-owned cobalt mines (between fifteen and nineteen [4]) in the DRC [5]. A strong relationship with the DRC benefits China’s national security by protecting its dominance over critical mineral production, putting US supply chains at risk [6]. It is even possible that the DRC could provide China with a naval base in West Africa, which would increase the reach of China’s navy outside of the Indo-Pacific [7].

(U) China is unlikely to intervene directly in favor of the DRC due to its policy of noninterference [6]. China could instead provide increased economic assistance to the DRC, as it has done through the Belt and Road Initiative.

(U) China may also support the DRC by providing military equipment and training. China has already sold Caihong 4 attack drones to the DRC [6] and offered to sell Chengdu FC-1 Xiaolong multi-role combat aircraft [8]. By expanding its robust training and military education cooperation with the DRC, China could further strengthen the DRC’s military and build closer relationships with its military leaders [4].

(U) By supporting the DRC in a future conflict with Rwanda, China could strengthen its economic, political, and security ties with the DRC, increasing its control over world critical mineral supplies. China could secure its cobalt supply chain, necessary to produce stealth technology and jet engines, while cutting off the United States. In a future conflict, China could also use critical minerals the way Russia uses oil, offering cheap supplies to nations which remain neutral and generating revenue despite sanctions [6]. Finally, by supporting the DRC, China could gain a security ally and even a naval base in West Africa, putting America’s interests on the continent and security in the Atlantic at risk.

Sources:

  1. Nedopil, Christoph. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative.” Green Finance & Development Center, 2023, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/.

  2.  “China Trade Balance, Exports and Imports by Country.” WITS Data, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2021/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-country.

  3.  “A retrospective look into Rwanda-China relations.” The New Times, 15 February 2024, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/14560/news/rwanda/a-retrospective-look-into-rwanda-china-relations.

  4.   ADF Staff. “In DRC, China Uses Military Aid, Corruption to Protect Mining Interests.” Africa Defense Forum, 22 November 2022, https://adf-magazine.com/2022/11/in-drc-china-uses-military-aid-corruption-to-protect-mining-interests/.

  5.  “Rwanda and the DRC at Risk of War as New M23 Rebellion Emerges: An Explainer.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 26 October 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/rwanda-drc-risk-of-war-new-m23-rebellion-emerges-explainer/.

  6.  Bociaga, Robert. “Minerals and China’s Military Assistance in the DR Congo.” The Diplomat, 31 October 2022, 

    https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/minerals-and-chinas-military-assistance-in-the-dr-congo/.

  7.  Thome, Lea. “China Continues Its Search for a Maritime Military Presence in West Africa.” The Diplomat, 22 February 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/china-continues-its-search-for-a-maritime-military-presence-in-west-africa/.

  8.  The Brussels Times Staff. “DRC: China offers Kinshasa its fighter planes.” The Brussels Times, 16 March 2023, https://www.brusselstimes.com/412442/drc-china-offers-kinshasa-its-fighter-planes.


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